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-vsDONALD JOE THORNTON,
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)
]
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from a conviction of rape in violation
of Section 76-53-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant-Appellant was charged with the
crime of rape.

Jury trial was had before Honorable

Charles G. Cowley in the Second Judicial District
on February 29, 1968.

The defendant was found

guilty and, on April 15, 1968, sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for a term of not less than ten
years, which could be for life.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the
judgment entered by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant, Donald Joe Thornton,
age 20, who has an IQ of 68 with severe characterlogical and personality problems (R. 6), who can
neither read (T. 128, 184) nor write (T.220), and
who went only to the third grade in the public
school system (T. 206), was arrested by Ogden City
Pol ice at about 4:00 P.M. on November 27, 1967, on
suspicion of rape and taken to the Ogden City
Police Station for interrogation (T. 62,68).
Donald was placed in an interrogation room at
police headquarters (T. 92) and, after being read
the Miranda Warnings (T. 64), was interrogated by
the arresting officer.

He made no indication that

he understood the warnings (T. 93) nor did the
interrogating officer make any effort to ascertain
whether he understood.

In fact, the arresting

officer testified that he merely assumed that the
defendant understood. (T. 72).
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Donald did not confess to the crime when firs
interrogated but did make certain incriminating
statements which were used against him at trial
(T. 67).

After a period of time another officer

relieved the arresting officer in the interrogatin 1
room and, after reading the Miranda Warnings fora
second time, continued the interrogation.

Several

more hours of questioning took place and a

sign~

statement was finally obtained (T.

85).

The purported statement was compiled from
answers that Donald gave to questions by the inter·
rogating officer (T. 134).

The questions asked bi

the officer were not recorded (T. 138).

The sten·

ographer who took down the statement testified tha!
it was a combination of statements by the defendant.
Donald Thornton, and details from police records
supplied by the interrogating officer (T. 148).
Examination of Donald at trial shows that he
was incapable of coping with the simple facts of
everyday life.

For example, he testified that

"there are around nine days in a week" (T. 180);
that the letters in the alphabet are "A, B, C, D,

4

E, -- I , J, K11 and

11

that 1 s as far as I know 11

(T. 188); that the month was

11

May 11 when actually

it was March (T. 180); when asked the difference
in value between twenty cents and twenty-five
cents,

11

that it [the quarter] is this much bigger"

(indicating the diameter with his hand) (T. 184);
and that the name of the street where he lived was
the only one in Ogden which he knew (T. 192, 208).
Donald was found guilty largely on the basis
of his incriminating statements and confession
which were allowed into evidence over defendant's
attorney's vigorous objections.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
CERTAIN SAFEGUARDS MUST BE MET BEFORE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS, WHETHER EXCULPATORY OR INCULPATORY, MAY BE USED BY THE PROSECUTION.
In the landmark decision of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct.
1602 (1966) the Supreme Court held:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
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safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444.
The court went on to set out the procedural
safeguards required.

It stated:

[T]hat prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney either retained
or appointed. 384 U.S. at 444.
Also, Miranda, supra, provides that the warn·
ing is necessary to

~ake

the defendant aware not

only of the privilege, but also of the consequences
of foregoing it.

Moreover, the court said that

defendant 1 s right to remain s i I ent and to be repre·
sented by counsel could be waived only if such
waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intel I igently.

(emphasis supplied)

In Miranda, supra, as we 11 as in other cases,
the Supreme Court has held that when interrogatrool
•

of a defendant continues without the presence of
an attorney, and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests upon the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination anc

'!
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his right to counsel.

Escabedo v. Illinois, 378

U. S. 478, 490, note 14, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 986,
84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 475, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602
(1966).
The court in Miranda, supra, said:
[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver
are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. 384 U.S. 479,
PO I NT 11
DEFENDANT IN THE CASE AT BAR DID NOT VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE HIS
RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO BE REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AND AS A RESULT HIS STATEMENTS ARE
INADMISSIBLE AND HIS CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED.
The Supreme Court held in Miranda, supra,
that the defendant must waive his

rights~-

tarily, knowingly, and intelligently and that a
heavy burden rests upon ·the state to show that the
defendant did so.

(emphasis supplied).

As the court stated in State v.
p. 2 d l 85 ( 1 968) :

~.

438

7
We recognize that in cases prior to Miranda we
were primarily concerned with the voluntariness
of the confession, whereas after Miranda, we
must, in addition, consider whether the accused
was informed of his constitutional rights and
whether he thereafter knowingly and intelligently waived these rights prior to making the
statement.
The waiver of constitutional rights, according
to the United States Supreme Court, must be voluntary, and every reasonable presumption is indulged
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
of one charged with a crime.

Moore v. Michigan,

355 U.S. 155, 2 L. Ed. 2d 167, 78 S. Ct. 191 (1957);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed.
680, 62 S. Ct. 457.
Whether the defendant in this case voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
remain silent and to counsel must be resolved upon
the whole record.

People v.

~.

432 P. 2d 207,

(1967).
The courts have said that the accused's intel·
1 igence, character, age, and situation at the time
of the confession are important factors to be
considered in resolving the question of knowledgable
and intelligent waiver.

~

v. State of

Alaba~,

8
202 So. 2d 539 (1967); People v. Lara, supra.
A review of the record in this case indicates
that the defendant did not have the mental capacity
to

11

intel I igently 11 and

stitutional rights.

11

knowingly 11 waive his con-

The psychiatric report on the

defendant, Donald Thornton, showed that he had an
IQ of 68 (R. 6), (T. 169), with characterlogical
and personality problems.

In~

v. Pattersen,

278 Fed. Supp. 703, (USDC, D. Colo. 1968), the
court took note that where the defendant had an IQ
of 76 that he had a mental age of roughly 12 years.
Again in People v. Lara, supra, the Supreme Court
of California noted that where the defendant's IQ
was between 65-71 that he had a mental age of about
10 years and two months.

By way of repetition the

defendant's IQ was reported to be 68.
Because of the defendant's mental inabilities
he attended public school only to the third grade
(T. 206), any subsequent schooling was obtained at
special schools for the "slow Jearner 11 in Ogden and
American Fork (T. 207).

The transcript shows that

the defendant could neither read (T. 128, 184, 208),
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nor write (T. 220).

He did not know the alphabet

(T. 188), nor the relative value of money (T. 184
208).

'

It is important to note that the defendant
did not know the names of any streets in Ogden
other than the one on which he 1 ived (T. 192,208),
this in 1 ight of the fact that his purported state·.

I

ments referred to specific streets other than the '
one on which he 1 ived.
Defendant's testimony also indicates that he
did not know the number of days in the week or the
month of the year (T. 180).

Defendant's trial was

held in March, but when the defendant was asked
what month it was he said he thought it was May.
(T. 180).

The record also indicates a general inability
to understand and respond to questions, as was
indicated by counse 1 1 s question to defendant as to '
the difference in value between twenty cents and a
quarter, to which the defendant responded by
indicating with his hand how much larger a quarter
was in terms of physical size (T. 184).

10

In People v.

~.

supra, the defendant was

charged with murder, along with another man.

In

that case, which is distinguishable from the case
at bar, the confession of the defendant was allowed
in despite the fact that defendant's IQ was reported as being between 65-71.

In admitting the con-

fession the court placed great weight on the
following facts:

that the defendant had gone to

the ninth or tenth grade in school, that he could
read and write, and that he stated to the codefendant that he would act dumb if given an IQ
test.

The court also took note of the defendant's

display of craftiness as evidenced by his wanting
to speak with the co-defendant before making any
statement and by his trying to make a deal with
the pol ice.

Also, the defendant had had numerous

previous "deal ings 11 with the pol ice and was fami liar with pol ice interrogation procedure.
By way of contrast the defendant in the case
at bar, because of his limited mental capacity,
attended public school only to the third grade.
His IQ tested at 68.

He could neither read nor

11
write, and the record indicates that he had diffiD
culty understanding questions posed to him by
counsel.

Also, there is no evidence of any craft-

iness on the part of the defendant nor any evidencE
that he had had previous dealings with the police
so as to put him at ease in pol ice surroundings.
The author asserts that because of defendant 1!
1 imited mental capacity he was unable to intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional righl
and as a result his statements were inadmissible
and his conviction must be reversed.
POINT I I I
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT VOLUNTARY AND
THEREFORE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
In Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513,
10 L. Ed. 2d 513, 83 S. Ct. 1336 (1963), the
Supreme Court held:
In determining the voluntariness of a confession of crime, the question in each case is
whether the defendant's will was overborne at
the time he confessed.
The District Court in Gilbert v. ~. 274 F. Supp
847 (USDC, S.D. Texas, 1967), in applying this
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standard stated that the question was to be decided:
By weighing the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the confession and
evaluating their probable effect on the confessor, with his peculiar weaknesses and
strengths.
Courts have consistently held that mental
retardation or subnormal intelligence weighs heavily
against a finding of capacity to
confession.

J:!.allo~

~ake

a voluntary

v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,

1 L. Ed 2d 1479, 77 S. Ct. 1356 (1957);

I!.!:.22.

v.

State of Alabama, 202 So. 2d 539 (1967); People v.
Lara, 432 P. 2d 207 (1967); Ford v. State of
Oklaho~a,

430 P. 2d 838 (1967);

~

v. Patterson,

278 F. Supp. 703 (USDC, D. Colo. 1968); Gilbert v.
~, 274 F. Supp. 847, (USDC, S.D. Texas 1968).

The defendant here has an IQ of 68 with a
mental age of around 10 or 11.

He has only a third

grade education and can neither read nor write.
The record shows that the defendant was picked
up by pol ice at about 4:00 P.M. on November 27, 1967
(T. 62).

From that time until about 8:30 or 9:00

P.M. (T. 68), a period of four or five hours, the
defendant was continuously questioned by two different
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officers (T. 68, 92) and as a result the defendant
finally broke down.
The two pol ice officers testified that the
defendant made statements to them referring to
specific streets in the city of Ogden (T. 67, 95,
119).

Testimony in other parts of the records

shows that the defendant only knew the name of the
street on which he 1 ived. (T. 192, 208).

Mrs. Rude,

a senior stenographer for the Ogden Police Department testified that the confession was not in the
defendant's own words and that it also contained
details fi I led in by Officer Scott from Pol ice
Records. (T. 148).

Mrs. Rude also stated that the

interrogation was conducted by asking the defendant
questions and that only the defendant's answers
were taken down. (T. 138) •
The defendant testified that he was told by
the officer questioning him that if he would sign
the statement that he could go home. (T 187).

This

fact, when taken in conte~t with the rest of the
record and in light of the defendant's limited
intelligence, militates against any claim on the

14

p3rt of the state that the defendant's statements
were voluntary.
Consequently, for the above reasons the State
has not sustained its burden of showing that the
defendant's statements were voluntary and therefore
they were not admissible in evidence and his conviction must be reversed.
PO I NT IV
THE STATE HAS NOT SUSTAINED ITS BURDEN OF
SHOWING A VOLUNTARY, KNOWING, AND INTELLIGENT
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS REQUIRED BY THE
DECISION IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, SUPRA.
The Record shows that Officer Donnely, the
officer who initially picked up the defendant,
read him the Miranda Warnings before interrogating
him,

However, the record is barren of any indica-

tion that the defendant understood the warnings or
knowingly waived them. (T. 93).

In fact, the

officer testified that he merely assumed that the
defendant understood. (T. 72).
The Miranda Court specifically held that no
statements obtained from a defendant while in
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custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in
any significant way would be admissible in evidence

1

unless the defendant had been informed of his right:
and had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived them.

Moreover, the court went on to hold

that a heavy burden rested on the state to show sud
a waiver and that waiver would not be presumed frn~
a s i I ent record.
At page 475 of the United States Supreme Court
Reports the court said:

[A] val id waiver will not be presumed simply
from the s i 1ence of the accused after warnings :
are given or simply from the fact that a con· '
fession was in fact eventually obtained . • . .
The record must show or there must be an
a 11 egat ion and ev i de nee that the warnings were
given and that the defendant i nte I 1 i gent I y and
understandingly waived them. Anything less is
not waiver. 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694,
724, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) [emphasis supplied].
The Miranda dee is ions specif i ca 11 y require that,
once the defendant has been taken into custody or
deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the
required warnings and waiver must be given before

!!.!!l questioning takes place. (emphasis supplied).
For that reason any warnings which are given sub·
sequent to the initial questioning are immaterial.
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The Record in the case at bar does not show
that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his constitutional rights,
and as a result the statements of the defendant
to Officers Donnelly and Scott, as well as his
subsequent confession, are inadmissible and his
conviction must be reversed.
POINT IV
STATEMENTS ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE WHICH
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS AS PROCEDUALLY
SET FORTH IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, SUPRA, ARE NOT
HARMLESS ERROR.
Miranda, supra, specifically holds that before
any statement of the defendant can be used against
him the prosecution must demonstrate that the
required warnings and waiver have been given.

All

three cases considered by the court in Miranda
were reversed when the court found that the above
requirements were not met.
When involuntary confessions have been introduced at trial, the court has always reversed
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convictions regardless of other evidence of guilt.
Lynumn v. 111 inois, 372 U.S. 528, 9 L.Ed. 2d 922,
83 S.Ct. 917 (1963); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401, 89 L.Ed. 1029, 65 S.Ct. 781; Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct.
824 (1967) concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stewart;
Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
As the court in the cases

~ited

above

indicates, the right to remain silent and the
right to be represented by counsel are considered
so fundamental that any infringement of them,
however slight, requires reversal.
The statements of the defendant allowed into
evidence over defendant's objection in this case
violated his right to remain silent and to be
represented by counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitu·
tion, and his conviction must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments presented in this briel
the State did not sustain its burden of showing
that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
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voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and
to be represented by counsel, and as a result
statements introduced into evidence were inadmissible and his conviction must be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON
WEBER COUNTY BAR LEGAL
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Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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